Positive Epistemology
Edited by Jonathan Ichikawa, forthcoming with Routledge
Whether to believe something is often an important question. It can be intellectually important, as in the pursuit of pure knowledge; it can also be morally and politically important, when it implicates questions about whom to trust and what to do. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that focuses on normative questions about belief. One of its central projects — perhaps its most central project — is the theoretical illumination of normative questions what one should believe, and what one shouldn’t believe.
It can be natural to frame that pair of questions together: when should one believe, and when should one not believe? In fact, however, much epistemology focuses much more on the negative: don’t believe unreliable sources, don’t believe on insufficient evidence, etc.
There is comparatively less discussion of positive epistemology. Positive epistemology is about the cases (if any) in which one should or must believe. While negative epistemology focuses on the possible error of believing too much, positive epistemology considers the possible error of believing too little; or equivalently, the possible error of mistaken suspension of judgment.
Positive Epistemology, edited by Jonathan Ichikawa, will commission twelve new philosophical essays exploring the (putative) positive side of epistemology The volume is currently under contract with Routledge. Following is the outline of the volume.
Introduction to Positive Epistemology, Jonathan Ichikawa
Part I Positive Epistemic Norms
Chapter 1 Dialectical Intrepidity, Genia Schönbaumsfeld
Chapter 2 Epistemic Norms and the Obligation to Combat Ignorance, Elís Miller
Chapter 3 Normative ‘Oomph’ and Functional Epistemic Oughts, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion
Part II On Belief
Chapter 4 Why Settle?, Sophia Dandelet
Chapter 5 The Doxastic Basis of Epistemic Asymmetry, Mark Schroeder
Chapter 6 Practical Requirements to Believe, Susanna Rinard
Part III Practical Reason and Positive Epistemology
Chapter 7 The Groom and the Addict: Does Committing to Difficult Endeavours Require Belief Against the Evidence?, Georgi Gardiner
Chapter 8 When Should We Believe What We May Believe? On Positivism and Epistemic Norms, Clayton Littlejohn and Stephen Finlay
Chapter 9 Doubt and the Status Quo, Jonathan Ichikawa
Part IV Ethics, Politics, and Positive Epistemology
Chapter 10 Deference to Burke, Neil Levy
Chapter 11 On Chum and Chumps, Matt Weiner
Chapter 12 Liberty of Conscience and Doxastic Harm, Allan Hazlett