Jonathan Ichikawa

Brief Description

Epistemology is about how to manage our beliefs. Few questions are more urgent or salient. We live in a world of ideologically-driven misinformation. From vaccine-hesitancy, to conspiracy theories, to Donald Trump’s “big lie”, it has become increasingly obvious to many people that epistemological mistakes — rational errors about what to believe — are a major source of social strife.

There are two sides to the question of what to believe: we should believe the things we should, and avoid believing the things we shouldn’t. But, I’ll argue, there is too much focus on the latter, negative problem. We worry a lot about the mistake of believing things we shouldn’t believe — both in ourselves, and, especially, in our assessments of others. (Isn’t it incredible, the ridiculous things that some of your political opponents think?) This bias in emphasis, focusing on the mistake of believing beyond the evidence, is very widespread, both in academic philosophy, and in general nonacademic ideas about rationality. My book is about the converse mistake. We need to worry much more than we do about the potential mistake of not believing. Sometimes we suspend judgment when we ought to believe.

This bias leads to theoretical epistemic confusion; but it also leads to moral and political complacency that entrenches oppressive norms. For there are important connections between epistemology, action, and politics — one acts on what one believes, and we judge actions justified only when based on what one is right to believe. Skeptical considerations and negative epistemic norms, then, motivate inaction. In many contexts, this amounts to a tacit endorsement of oppressive features of the status quo. Think of the ways that “he-said–she-said” discourse is used to avoid passing judgment about cases of alleged sexual abuse. The problem isn’t (always) believing that the accusation is false — sometimes the failure to believe it to be true is enough to do.

Failure to believe what one should can be a kind of epistemic cowardice. Suspending judgment feels safe — it often means you don’t have to react proactively to the world around you. A virtuous epistemic agent will exhibit epistemic courage, believing that which they should, even when doing so is difficult. This is important within epistemology — it’s part of doing a good job deciding what to believe. It is also morally, socially, and political important: it is part of being a good person, making good decisions, and making a better world.

Think of the ways that “he-said–she-said” discourse is used to avoid passing judgment about cases of alleged sexual abuse. The problem isn’t (always) believing that the accusation is false — sometimes the failure to believe it to be true is enough to do harm and contribute to rape culture. Think of the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the CDC refused to recommend the use of masks, on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence of their effectiveness. Think of the decades of campaigning from the fossil fuel industry, peddling “reasonable doubt” about human contribution to climate change. Think of victims of gaslighting, who worry that their misgivings might be the result of them just being too emotional, and jumping to conclusions. All of these harmful skeptical moves were buttressed by epistemology’s bias to the negative.

My book is an academic monograph, but I aim it at both philosophical researchers and the general public. It will develop the theoretical and practical importance of epistemic courage, grounded both in academic philosophy and in anti-oppressive activism.

Related Publications

Here are some recent publications related to the theme of the book. In some cases, some of this material has been adapted into chapters.

• You Ought to Have Known: Positive Epistemic Norms in a Knowledge-First Framework

• Contextual Injustice

• Faith and Epistemology

• Rape Culture and Epistemology (co-authored with Bianca Crewe)